1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON			
3	CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL) DIVERSITY; CASCADIA WILDLANDS;)			
4	PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION OF) FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATIONS;)			
5 6	RESOURCES; NATIVE FISH)			
		- 2 10 01025 MO		
7	Plaintiffs,) Case N	o. 3:18-cv-01035-MO		
8	v.)			
9	PETER DAUGHERTY, in his) Januar official capacity as Oregon)	y 17, 2019		
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11	II			
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13	Forester for the Forest Grove) District; DANIEL GOODY, in his)			
14 15	Forester for the Astoria)			
16	Defendants.) Portla	nd, Oregon		
17	and)			
18	OREGON FOREST INDUSTRIES) COUNCIL and TILLAMOOK COUNTY,)			
19	II ' ' '			
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22	Oral Argument			
23	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS			
24	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL W. MOSMAN			
25	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CHIEF JUDGE			

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2	APPEARANCES	
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4	FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:	Ms. Amy R. Atwood
5		Center for Biological Diversity P.O. Box 11374 Portland OR 97211
6		Portland, OR 97211
7	FOR THE DEFENDANTS:	Ms. Darsee Staley Ms. Sarah K. Weston
8		Oregon Department of Justice 100 S.W. Market Street
9		Portland, OR 97201
10		
11	FOR INTERVENOR DEFENDANT	
12	OREGON FOREST INDUSTRIES COUNCIL:	Mr. Ryan P. Steen
13		Stoel Rives LLP 600 University Street, Suite 3600 Seattle, WA 98101
14		Seaccie, WA Joioi
15	FOR INTERVENOR DEFENDANT TILLAMOOK COUNTY:	Mr. Jay T. Waldron
16	TIMAROOK COONTI.	Schwabe Williamson & Wyatt 1211 S.W. Fifth Avenue, Suite 1600
17		Portland, OR 97204
18		
19	ALSO PRESENT:	Mr. Noah Greenwald
20		
21	COURT REPORTER:	Bonita J. Shumway, CSR, RMR, CRR United States District Courthouse
22		1000 S.W. Third Ave., Room 301 Portland, OR 97204
23		(503) 326-8188
24		
25		

1 (PROCEEDINGS)2 (January 17, 2019; 10:40 a.m.) 3 THE CLERK: We're here today in Case No. 3:18-cv-1035-MO, Center for Biological Diversity, et al. v. 4 5 Daugherty, et al. 6 Counsel, please state your name. 7 MS. ATWOOD: Amy Atwood on behalf of the plaintiff. MS. WESTON: Sarah Weston on behalf of the State 8 9 defendants. 10 MR. WALDRON: Jay Waldron on behalf of Tillamook 11 County. 12 MR. STEEN: Ryan Steen on behalf of the Oregon Forest 13 Industries Council. 14 THE COURT: Others should also introduce themselves. 15 Go ahead. 16 MS. STALEY: Good morning, Your Honor. Darsee Staley, also for the State defendants. 17 MR. GREENWALD: Noah Greenwald with plaintiffs. 18 19 THE COURT: Let me give you my tentative thoughts on 20 the matters here before me. They're just tentative, so I'll 21 want to hear your oral arguments. And I should say that in the 22 course of making these remarks, I may end up describing what a 23 complaint should do instead of what this one actually does, 24 with a view towards moving towards the future in this case. 25 So there are several challenges to the complaint in

this case. The first is the straight-up Eleventh Amendment challenge about retrospective declaratory relief. And so if this were a complaint that sought retrospective declaratory relief, that would violate the Eleventh Amendment. There can be, in some cases, an exception where some sort of declaration about past conduct by the State forms an integral part of answering a question about future conduct, and so there may be that exception out there to the Eleventh Amendment.

There are two things about this case that I think make that less important here. One is that our plaintiff in briefing -- not so much in the complaint. The complaint, I think, certainly would leave one with the impression that retrospective relief was being sought, but the plaintiff now disavows seeking retrospective relief. So, to that degree, I take plaintiff at its word, and so therefore I deny the motion regarding the prohibition by the Eleventh Amendment for retrospective relief, unless somehow I sort of misunderstood plaintiffs' position.

I will say this about a complaint discussing past behavior when it can only seek future injunctive relief, and that is that it's, of course, a part of many, many complaints, and it's an appropriate part of a complaint against a state to sort of recite what has happened in the past as a step towards proving the imminence of future harm.

So if you say, you know, that a particular form of

logging -- you know, helicopter logging in the past has always resulted in these harms, and the State is about to engage in helicopter logging and therefore the harm again is imminent, you've just used the past to prove imminent future harm.

There's nothing that the Eleventh Amendment says that prohibits that.

And I take it that much -- maybe all of what the complaint in this case is saying about the past is to that end. Is that about right?

MS. ATWOOD: Yes, Your Honor, that's right.

Just to round out that a little bit more, I wanted to make a couple of things clear. The history in particular of the National Marine Fisheries Service engaging with the ESU in making its determination throughout the years happened multiple times. It happened alongside the threats that were continuing. And any of us who are from the Pacific Northwest know that salmon are threatened by myriad threats.

But if you read the rules here, you'll come to see that the service had determined multiple times, including after challenges in court and the service making new listing determinations, reiterated time and time again that the primary threat, ongoing threat to this ESU is the impairment of its fresh water habitat, and in particular the headwater streams that coho salmon require.

And so we felt that it was important to pull out that

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important history so that the Court could understand that, but also for the purpose that you explained. And I would also, just to supplement that, note that the special rule talks a lot about some of the issues that the State is concerned about, things like large woody debris and stream buffers. So all of this was --THE COURT: Thank you. I think that's all I need to hear on this. So unless the State or other actors otherwise here have concerns, you've essentially gained what you sought by this motion, in the sense of not being subjected to retrospective relief. Anything further you need to offer on this issue, on the Eleventh Amendment issue? MS. WESTON: Your Honor --THE COURT: Go ahead. MS. WESTON: We appreciate the Court's ruling on that, and I guess we would just reserve the right to, if the second amended complaint does contain a request for retrospective relief, we'd reserve the right to raise this issue again if it's necessary, although in light of the Court's --THE COURT: Well, you won't need to raise it again at the pleading level. I suppose it could come up at summary judgment somehow, but it's sort of hornbook law that having

disavowed in pleadings any attempt to seek retrospective relief, plaintiffs are going to be barred by that. So it's not going to come up again.

MS. WESTON: Thank you.

THE COURT: So that's my ruling on the Eleventh Amendment.

The next argument defendants make against this complaint is one that would seek to require plaintiffs to plead the complaint on a sale-by-sale approach. And the argument is really sort of a -- one that says that a complaint under Section 9 has to be by a sale-by-sale approach in order to state a claim. So I guess for both sides, my tentative views are kind of good news-bad news.

So for plaintiff, the good news is I don't think that's a per se rule. I don't think it's by definition necessary to adopt a sale-by-sale approach in order to adequately state a claim. And I'll confess that although it's not really briefed this way, my analysis of this really falls more under Iqbal/Twombly than something else. And I think that's the right way to think about the complaint on this score.

The bad news for plaintiff is that I do think this complaint is at an improperly high level of generality and doesn't sufficiently -- doesn't allege facts with sufficient specificity under Iqbal/Twombly and doesn't really allow the

defendants to prepare a meaningful defense. It doesn't give them the kind of specificity required.

So, in general, I think a complaint on this score -what has to be avoided is a complaint that says, you know,
logging has damaged salmon habitat in a variety of ways in the
Northwest in the past, there's going to be logging on these
sites, therefore salmon habitat will be damaged.

And this complaint now comes perilously close to sort of that proposition, and that's at a very high level of generality. So certainly a sale-by-sale approach in which one says this sale has these features about it that will trigger -- imminently trigger harms known to be caused by this kind of logging on this sort of terrain is enough and will satisfy Iqbal/Twombly.

Whether you can figure out a way to plead this complaint without doing a sale-by-sale approach, that's up to you, since I don't think it's absolutely required. I will confess that I have a hard time seeing how you can get there without a sale-by-sale approach. So I'm not sure what to say about my tentative thoughts here, other than I think I would deny a motion that requires a sale-by-sale approach, but I would require plaintiffs to replead to be more specific, since I don't think there's enough here to tee up a meaningful defense.

With those tentative thoughts, I'll hear first from

plaintiff.

MS. ATWOOD: Sure, Your Honor. I do think I'm very confident that we can get there. I would encourage the Court to look at Judge Aiken's explanation of how, you know, timber sales are planned and sold, and in the case of the Tillamook and Clatsop State Forests, there are several layers, and one of those is an annual operations plan and the other one is an implementation plan.

THE COURT: I'm going to stop you there. So, first, I think I have some understanding of that, as all of the lawyers in the room here and myself have some understanding of how these sales work, and, in fact, some general understanding of the various ways in which salmon can be threatened by threatening their habitat. So what is important to me here is that that knowledge gets put on paper in the complaint.

And that's, I think, one of the flaws in the complaint. It simply assumes a lot of things can be filled in by a knowledgeable reader, but that's not what complaints are obligated to do. So I think that's what's missing is the complaint has to lay out with greater specificity how you know that a particular sale, or at least a particular feature of the landscape is threatened by a particular type of harvesting activity.

MS. ATWOOD: What I was going to suggest to the Court was that we could look at this on a watershed basis. Our chain

of causation alleges that the logging activities that are ongoing and approved by the defendants increase the background rate of landslides at the watershed level.

They also tend to plan their timber sales for the coming year, for the coming term by watershed, and I think that is -- if the Court would be okay with that, we would explore pulling together some of those sales, which would avoid the problems of the sale-by-sale approach but provide perhaps more of the information that the Court is asking for.

THE COURT: Thank you.

For the defense?

MS. WESTON: Your Honor, I want to make sure that we're on the same page. The State's motion was a motion to make more definite and certain, which of course is analyzed with a view towards the *Iqbal/Twombly* standards, but I want to make sure we're all on the same page about what the motion was.

THE COURT: We are. We're just in federal court, where motions to make more definite and certain are very unpopular.

MS. WESTON: Fair enough. And this was not a motion that the State made lightly, Your Honor, but this is a case that is not a programmatic challenge. Plaintiffs have disavowed that it's a programmatic challenge. Nothing in the complaint suggested it's a programmatic challenge. It's an as-applied challenge, and plaintiffs' complaint and their

response effectively says, well, it's as-applied, but we don't have to tell you as applied how or where or what.

THE COURT: What is the level of specificity that you think is required? Not optimal, just required.

MS. WESTON: Your Honor, I think because this case involves a chain of causation that is attenuated in time and attenuated in terms of the number of links in the chain, we need as much specificity as we can get so we can know what conduct they're talking about, where is that conduct occurring and --

THE COURT: So let's take one of the harms, landslides. You understand the end of the chain, right? You understand the harm plaintiffs allege flows from landslides into streams?

MS. WESTON: Well, I guess I have two answers to that. One is that, you know, as a relatively knowledgeable reader, I do understand that landslides can have impact on streams, some of which are beneficial and part of the natural disturbance regime that creates complex habitat, and some of which are less beneficial. And we understand plaintiffs' position to be that logging on some unspecified steep slopes results in an increase in the rate of landslides for some period of time after a timber harvest.

We don't understand what they mean by steep slopes, we don't know which sales they allege both have those steep

slopes and are located in such a --

THE COURT: That's what I want to do is sort of work backwards from the landslide itself back up the causal chain to see where you think specificity is lacking.

So you don't know what "steep slopes" means. Are you suggesting that the actual geographical terrain, you know, a slope next to this stream on a particular bluff or mountainside has to be identified in the complaint?

MS. WESTON: Your Honor --

THE COURT: This half acre right here can't be logged for risk of landslides. Is that the specificity you think is required?

MS. WESTON: Your Honor, like the Court, I have difficulty imagining how, given the number of factors that affect the likelihood of landslides -- and again, as a knowledgeable reader -- the number of factors that affects likelihood of landslides, the number of factors that affect where that landslide ends up, the number of factors that affect the characteristics of that landslide, whether it looks like a landslide that occurs on unharvested land or not. Given all of those factors that go into a landslide, and sort of going from timber harvest to landslide to a significant enough impact on a stream where coho are present at a critical life stage and an impact that lasts long enough, it's difficult for me to imagine something other than a sale-by-sale or location-by-location

description.

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With that said, I suppose it's possible that plaintiffs could say that any -- we allege and our expert intends to testify that, you know, a slope of X steepness on X kind of geological -- X kind of geological formations underneath it with these other features that's within X distance of a stream or on a flow path that's identified in such a way that we know there's coho in that stream, potentially you could get there that way. I guess --THE COURT: Well, to do that, they'd have to identify -- I quess what you're asking for is significantly

greater specificity on what "steep slope" means, right?

MS. WESTON: Significantly greater specificity on what a steep slope means. And again --

THE COURT: And then some recitation in the complaint grounded in some form of expert testimony. It wouldn't have to be testimony retained in this case, but some established expert testimony about distance from logging that might cause a landslide to streams, right?

MS. WESTON: Well --

I think that's what I heard you say. THE COURT:

MS. WESTON: Well, I don't believe plaintiffs have to plead their evidence. I think they have to plead their fact that they intend to prove. So I don't know that they need to recite that their expert is going to say this, although I

imagine --

THE COURT: I wasn't suggesting that they had to recite a particular stream, just that you think the chain of causation they must allege has to allege that logging on a particular sort of slope, defined, can cause harmful landslides, and that that's true because those landslides are within some defined distance that will affect streams. Is that what you said or am I misunderstanding?

MS. WESTON: That's part of what -- that is what I said in talking about landslides. It may be helpful to think of this in terms of the elements of a Section 9 claim, where plaintiffs are going to need to allege and prove -- you know, they need to identify what habitat they're talking about and establish that there are listed species there at the material time. They're going to need to allege and prove the nature and attributes of the modification that they allege is occurring in that particular habitat. They're going to need to allege that that modification is so significant that it kills or injures actual identified fish.

THE COURT: What do you mean by "actual identified fish"?

MS. WESTON: Fish that exist in that stream. They don't have to find a fish named Fred, but they need to be able to establish the presence of the listed species at a critical time. So, you know, if sediment buries gravel for some period

of time where there aren't eggs in the gravel, and then it's washed away by -- before the next set of eggs come in, that doesn't establish --

THE COURT: Why isn't that more summary judgment than motion to dismiss? I mean, let's take, for example, the suggestion made by plaintiff that they did this on a watershed basis. So nothing in the complaint that alleges this harm on a watershed basis will allow you -- will require them to say that there are threatened salmon in a particular stream, and that stream, that particular stream is close enough to a particular steep slope that logging that slope might cause the harm. I mean, certainly that sort of particularity would satisfy anybody's definition of Iqbal/Twombly, but I've never seen ever an environmental complaint have to pass through that sort of filter to be specific enough.

So what's less than identifying a particular stream but sufficient enough? I mean, you're the one who is saying this is not specific enough. So what is specific enough?

MS. WESTON: Your Honor, the State's position is that when we look at this complaint, we don't know which sales they're seeking to enjoin. We don't know which --

THE COURT: I understand that, and I agree. What I don't want to do is have them amend and not know how much they need to amend and have you sit here and say, well, we're not going to tell you how good it has to be, we'll just keep

challenging it until you hit some undefined magic mark.

What's a good enough complaint on the link of causation? We're focusing right now on landslides, and I think it's a good proxy for the various harms alleged in the complaint.

What is specific enough? You can say it without knowing whether plaintiffs can meet it. I mean, that's fair. I'm not asking you to write their complaint for them. But what is specific enough to pass muster here to state a claim that satisfies both *Twombly* and be definite and certain enough on the chain of causation between logging a hillside and a landslide negatively affecting habitat?

MS. WESTON: Your Honor, the State defendants need to be able to read the complaint and be able to discern from the complaint which of their sales are implicated.

THE COURT: So if a complaint focuses on a watershed and said sales in this watershed involve a watershed in which the threatened species are present, and that when sales in this watershed log on steep slopes, it increases the risk of landslides flowing into streams, what they've already said about the negative effects on salmon when it happens, then can't you then go to that watershed, take a look at the sales that are present, contest whether that's really happening here, whether that harm is really imminent or not, and come back to me at summary judgment?

MS. WESTON: Your Honor, without seeing such a hypothetical complaint, it's a little difficult to say, but potentially with landslides, if we understood what types of slopes they were talking about and how direct the connection between the location of the landslide and a stream -- not just a stream but a stream where actually coho are living, because coho don't live in all of the streams in a watershed, some of the streams are too small for them to live in -- potentially that would help. That would get us there with landslides.

With roads --

THE COURT: Let's just pick up that thought for just a moment. Why isn't that something where that's just part of your defense to say, they've made this somewhat general challenge to logging on steep slopes in this watershed, but we went and looked at this sale, and this sale doesn't involve logging anywhere near any stream where coho are actually present. Why can't that be your burden post-complaint instead of a burden built into their allegations of the complaint?

MS. WESTON: Your Honor, because they're the plaintiffs and they need to allege each of the elements of a Section 9 claim. One of those elements is presence of a listed species in habitat that's being modified.

And here because we have a modification that's not occurring in the habitat -- or an activity that's not occurring in the habitat, and this isn't sort of we're cutting down a

tree where a bird clearly lives that is listed, and this is, you know -- there's a bunch of steps that are here, and so in this case, unlike perhaps in some other kind of ESA case, the State is prejudiced by not knowing exactly where and what we're talking about.

And the Court obviously has some amount of discretion in a more definite statement motion, and here, you know, trial by ambush just isn't how it's supposed to work in federal court, and the State shouldn't have to prove a negative to figure out what it is that plaintiffs are seeking to enjoin in this case.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

MR. WALDRON: Your Honor, may I just add a little perspective to the questions you just asked?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WALDRON: Jay Waldron for Tillamook.

I think sometimes when we read complaints, we fail to see the magnitude of what's at issue here. The Tillamook

Forest is 570 square miles. It is 100 square miles larger than Multnomah County. There are seven, as Your Honor probably knows, major rivers there, the Kilches, the Miami. There are seven. There are many thousands of streams and tributaries in the forest.

And, I mean, my clients live there, you know. As you know from our pleadings, they depend on the forest for much of

their school funds and much of their county -- part of their county budget. And just saying "landslide," for example, when there's thousands of streams, some have coho, some -- most don't.

And when you just say a landslide, landslides, Your Honor, in Tillamook County, obviously, the whole -- about half the county is steep slopes, and they're everywhere. There are hundreds of square miles of steep slopes.

And to go a little bit that isn't in the briefing, the -- when the implementation plan is done or the sale plan is done, it's got incredible detail about where, when, how, what, what effect on this slope, that slope, the next slope, this water body, that water body. And I think what the attorney for the State is trying to convey -- and I'm trying to convey, also -- is there's no way to get the who, where, what, how. There's -- Palsgraf is missing here.

THE COURT: I understand your point, it's just I'm concerned that the same argument you're making about a challenge that involves, you know, the whole forest or even the whole watershed, you'd almost make the same argument with regard to the whole sale. I mean, you could have a particular sale, and you could say of that sale, you know, it involves a lot of land with many slopes and many streams, and we still don't know which one they're talking about.

I mean, why isn't your argument one that would

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require the plaintiff to say, this stream has coho in it and X feet away is a slope, if you log this slope, we believe there will be a landslide to negatively impact, you know, at mile marker whatever, this stream? MR. WALDRON: Your Honor, I wouldn't disagree with you if that was the type of specificity, because there's --THE COURT: I'm asking if that's the type of specificity you think is required by law. MR. WALDRON: Yes. I think that somehow -- the standard for liberal federal pleadings is it can't be speculative. And I think, from talking to my clients, the way the complaint is now, and even the way you said it, by watershed, you're talking about hundreds of square miles that could be in one of those watersheds. It's almost saying curves in Multnomah County cause accidents. THE COURT: Are you suggesting then that even a sale-by-sale approach is not specific enough? MR. WALDRON: I think that's specific enough, yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, why? Why is that specific enough? You still don't know which of many slopes and many streams is involved. You just have to go figure it out on your own? MR. WALDRON: Mr. Steen would probably know the answer better, but most sales are 30 to 200 acres, and they're in a specific -- I'm not much on being a forester, but they're

in specific areas, and if there was a sale listed, the implementation plan is going to have every detail about that area. And yes, then the State, Tillamook County, and OFIC could defend that.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Your response?

I'm sorry, Mr. Steen, go ahead.

MR. STEEN: Just a brief point to follow up on Mr. Waldron. I agree that -- I can't see how it could be anything other than a sale-by-sale, because I don't think you'd have the specificity to tie what they're alleging will happen -- which is injury or death of a coho salmon -- to the specific activity. So there has to be some allegation of what that activity is.

I think what guides this a little bit is the case cited in the briefing, Environmental Protection Information

Center v. Tuttle. In that case you kind of had the reverse, in that it involved California but still coho salmon, but it was a challenge to the regulations and plans that governed timber harvesting. And the Court rejected that and said that what the plaintiffs needed to instead do was to bring a challenge to, quote, site, a site-specific challenge to a timber harvest, and that that would have the distinct and developed facts necessary for the Court to hear a claim.

And I think that is instructive for this case here.

We need some allegations of where the activities are and what they are going to be, for example, in a timber sale, that's ultimately going to cause, as the plaintiffs have said, injury or death of coho salmon. And that's I believe what is missing from the complaint.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MS. ATWOOD: Your Honor, may I respond?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. ATWOOD: Well, first to respond to Mr. Waldron.

You can hear me okay?

I just wanted to point out -- I don't know if this is the direction the Court is going, but we did include a table at the end of our complaint with 65 timber sales. That complaint was filed in June. Half of these sales have been logged or sold. That alone represents the inherent difficulty of trying to litigate this case on a sale-by-sale basis.

I would also just point out that in the table we identify certain attributes of these sales that lends them to a higher risk of landslides, and we also ensured that they were upstream of coho -- occupied coho habitat.

I think that the -- to respond to Mr. Steen, the *EPIC* v. Tuttle case is instructive, but it's a lot like a lot of the other cases that do talk about this sort of Section 9 challenge to ad hoc decision making. In other words, rather than going for a challenge to a policy or, as the State puts it, a

program, we're going to look at the licensing decisions; we're going to look at the types of consistent decision making that the State is engaging in.

And so I actually think that *Tuttle* supports our position, and from what I'm hearing, it doesn't sound like Mr. Waldron would object to a watershed-by-watershed approach.

THE COURT: I mean, that's exactly what he objected to. I don't know how you heard differently.

MS. ATWOOD: Well, he discussed how large the forest is and how there are these various watersheds. And that is consistent with what I was suggesting earlier, which is that these decisions they make on a ten-year and an annual basis do look at the watersheds. And our chain of causation alleges a watershed -- almost a watershed-level impact, both in the form of harm, and we also have alleged facts to support harassment.

Again, I understand this is not the direction that the Court is going, but I just wanted to --

THE COURT: What is your obstacle to alleging a sale-by-sale approach?

MS. ATWOOD: Well, as made evident by the fact that half of the sales in our table have already been sold or completely logged, I think it would be incredibly difficult for the parties and the Court to manage a sale-by-sale approach with discovery. We have a team of four experts to address every single link in our chain of causation. To go through

both fact and expert discovery, summary judgment briefing, and a trial to deal with sales that, in their view, are moot as soon as they're sold, I just don't see how that's the best use of anyone's time.

THE COURT: So you're just saying that the sales are completed before you can litigate them?

MS. ATWOOD: Well, that's what they're saying. Yes, that's right, Your Honor. And they're saying that they're moot because they've already been sold. In other words, the legal ownership permission was transferred to the operator.

THE COURT: Why isn't that the whole point of future injunctive relief that would prevent the sales from being mooted while it's being litigated?

MS. ATWOOD: I'm sorry, I don't understand the question, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, if what you're seeking, if you have a complaint that alleges multiple sales and alleges imminent harm and seeks injunctive relief, then why couldn't you at the same time to solve that problem seek preliminary injunctive relief in order to litigate the imminent harm on a permanent basis?

MS. ATWOOD: Your Honor, we have considered that seriously and it's not an option we've taken off the table, but given the experience in the *Pacific Rivers Council v. Brown* case, it seems to us that in that case Judge Brown was

concerned with the absence of enough factual development in the PI context to grant the PI. And so we are not trying to over-litigate this case, but we want to make sure that the Court has everything that it needs order to make a decision on the merits.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MS. WESTON: Your Honor, can I just make one -- the State's position is not that the sales are moot once they are sold. I mean, those contracts run for a number of years because there's a certain amount of preparatory work, where they do some road maintenance and then the harvest happens and then hauling. Our position is once the trees are all cut down and have been hauled out of the woods, there's nothing for the Court to order.

And so with respect -- with respect, I think the Court could probably get through this litigation in less than a three-year contract term. The next round of sales is going out for public comment in March. If the Court gave the plaintiffs until the end of March to amend their complaint, we could include proposed sales from that round and we would have some specific facts for us to work with and --

THE COURT: Thank you.

Well, I've said, and I still maintain that there's nothing in the law that requires a sale-by-sale approach as some sort of statutory or regulatory requirement, but a certain

level of specificity is required by pleading standards in federal court, if nothing else. And the ultimate goal is to have a set of pleadings that allows a defendant to undertake a defense, and this complaint, in my view, fails to do that.

And I think the level of specificity, while not -while not stream by stream -- that's I don't think required at
all -- does require the ability to have a manageable piece of
terrain that the defendants can then go investigate whether
what's alleged in the complaint is really what is going to
happen on a manageable piece of terrain. And if that terrain
is too large, then it can't be done. It can't be done if
it's -- in any reasonable period of time or in some instance
probably not humanly possible if the piece of terrain is too
large.

So we use proxies for just this abstract requirement of specificity, and in this case I agree that the complaint has to allege a sale-by-sale approach using sales as an adequate proxy for the kind of specificity that narrows down the terrain in question to allow a meaningful undertaking of the defense.

So I grant the motion against the complaint, and I will allow repleading, but require the pleading to take place on a sale-by-sale basis.

The principal rationale for not undertaking a sale-by-sale approach is not that it can't be done in terms of the specificity of the complaint, but rather that it allows a

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sort of a -- it's almost a -- it's not quite, but it's almost sort of a capable of -- capable of evaluation but evading review sort of problem. And I don't want to do that, and so I will undertake to make sure the case advances rapidly enough, and I will keep in mind the obstacles to plaintiff in trying to litigate a number of sales before they sort of slip away from the Court's limited jurisdiction in a case like this. But I still think, and I do hold that that level of specificity is what I would require in a future complaint. The next argument I need to evaluate is that --MS. ATWOOD: Your Honor --THE COURT: Yes? MS. ATWOOD: May I ask just a point of clarification about the sale-by-sale approach? THE COURT: Of course. MS. ATWOOD: Would the Court prefer that we identify the sales and assign a claim to each sale, or would you rather that we include the sales, as we have here, in a table format and say in one claim, for example, that these are the sales with the features that are reasonably certain to result in harm and harassment? THE COURT: There's nothing wrong with the latter approach as long as it's not generic. If you identify, you know, a group of five sales --

just pulling a number out of thin air -- that in your view

could be alleged individually, each with a particular claim for the particular harm, but the claims are the same statutory framework and involve the same factual harm that you want to allege, then you can group them. That's fine. I just don't want you to use grouping as a way of not being specific about claim-by-claim analysis -- excuse me, sale-by-sale analysis.

MS. ATWOOD: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The next argument is that claims related to completed logging are moot. And it's not so much that it's moot, it's that it's not on the table. So I am -- I don't need to hear further argument on that. I deny the motion on the theory of mootness, but agree that there aren't claims in the case about completed logging.

The next argument seeks to dismiss parts of the complaint related -- or requesting relief to stream buffers, related to stream buffers.

There's really a pair of arguments about stream buffers. One is that I ought to strike several parts of the complaint regarding stream buffers as immaterial under Rule 12(f). And I generally think that's not the case. I don't read the complaint as seeking to impose on the State defendants, for example, federal requirements about stream buffers. Again, I think that the stream buffers in most instances seek to just tell the causational story, and stream buffers are a part of telling the causational story here.

So I deny at the motion to strike level almost all of what defendants have requested.

There is at paragraph 64 just a single reference that references a federal recovery plan for a geographically distinct group of salmon, and so that does, in my view, become immaterial even to the telling of the causational story here. So I grant the motion to strike paragraph 64.

And there is the suggestion by defendants that the aerial photograph in paragraph 113 is not in their challenged land. I don't know if you've had a chance to look at paragraph 113 any further.

MS. ATWOOD: Yes, Your Honor. And the plaintiffs apologize for the inconvenience and to the State for having to verify that. My understanding is that there was an error interpreting our mapping, but these particular points that were in those sales are on the kind of terrain that we're talking about, utilized road construction methods that we're talking about, and were very close to the state lands. That said, we're happy to remove those photographs and replace them with something that illustrates the problem on the state forest.

THE COURT: All right. Then I do grant the motion to strike the aerial photographs of landslides included in the complaint at paragraph 113, and otherwise deny the motions to strike.

The other argument isn't a motion to strike, it's to

dismiss really on the idea that features of landscape that aren't currently habitat aren't really protected under Section 9. And so that's a series of cases involving owls and others, and the idea that to allege -- even to accurately allege a claim under Section 9, you've got to allege habitat currently being utilized by the threatened or endangered species.

And that's sort of got an interesting application here. I don't think those cases apply to our case, our theory of the complaint here. It's true that the standing trees that if logged fail to become fallen trees and habitat while they are standing are manifestly not coho salmon habitat. That would be -- I'd like to see that case. But the theory is an adequate one under Section 9, that you're taking away future habitat in a way that I don't think it's fair to apply those other cases or that principle to this complaint, so I deny the motion to strike or dismiss paragraphs related to stream buffers on the idea that in their present condition they're not currently coho habitat.

There is a motion for a more definite statement, which I think I already covered under the sale-by-sale ruling I've made.

And lastly there's a motion for judicial notice. The documents being sought for judicial notice are the classic sorts of documents on which I'd normally take judicial notice,

1 except that I don't see anybody relying on them here. 2 is an element of judicial notice, that it has to be something 3 you're relying on. Can you help me with that? Sure, Your Honor. The State's motion 4 MS. WESTON: 5 relied on those to sort of tell the background of what -- how 6 the State applies this robust program of protective measures 7 that involves sort of rules and standards about roads and how we do leave trees on steep slopes and so forth. 8 THE COURT: Well, you relied on them by --9 10 MS. WESTON: Citing them. 11 THE COURT: -- quoting those things in your brief? 12 MS. WESTON: And then in -- with respect to the federal documents, it was in making our arguments as to why 13 14 those materials are relevant, we wanted to make sure that the 15 document we were talking about was also before the Court. Ι 16 don't know that it's critical that they in fact be in the record. 17 It was more for the convenience of the Court. 18 THE COURT: To be clear, you're not asking me to take 19 into account any portion of those documents that's not already 20 in your pleadings today? 21 MS. WESTON: No, sir. 22 THE COURT: If I just take into account those 23 portions of those documents, do you have any objection? 24 MS. ATWOOD: Not at this stage, Your Honor. I would 25 just ask that we not be barred from quoting other potentially

relevant aspects of the recovery plan in our brief.

THE COURT: No, not at all.

So I will -- I will rely on the portions of those documents cited in the briefing to me here already. I'm not going to take judicial notice of them, which actually brings into the record those entire documents, only because the entire documents aren't anything the parties are advancing towards me today. That doesn't mean that in the future both sides aren't free to pull in more of those documents. I'm just ruling on what I have in front of me here today.

Anything further from plaintiff?

MS. ATWOOD: I do want to just make sure the Court is aware of all of the case law that says that the Court maintains its full scope of equitable discretion when fashioning the appropriate injunction if and when we get to that point, notwithstanding some of the earlier topics we've discussed today.

THE COURT: Are you talking about the limits of the Eleventh Amendment or something else?

MS. ATWOOD: I am talking about -- it's within the context of the Eleventh Amendment argument that they're making, and I just wanted to point the Court to some of the cases that discuss how under both the ESA and the *Ex parte Young* doctrine, the Court does retain the full scope of its equitable powers. And if you would like, I could read you some of the various

injunctions that courts have issued with the express understanding that they are not so limited, so that the *Ex parte Young* doctrine does not allow the Court to entertain any cases except for prospective relief against state officers violating federal law. That does not restrain the Court's equitable discretion.

THE COURT: Well, we're a long way from that day.

MS. ATWOOD: I know.

THE COURT: But I am well aware that I have awesome powers. All right?

Anything further from the now very nervous State defendants?

MS. WESTON: Excuse me, Your Honor.

If I could just go back for a moment to the stream buffers issue. The State's argument is not that trees are salmon habitat. The State's argument is that Section 9 does not require the State to create future habitat, and failure to protect future habitat is not a Section 9 violation.

And the other issue on the stream buffer question is that we had two reasons for wanting to dismiss any claim that was alleging a Section 9 violation based on failure to input large woody debris into the streams, one of which was, in our view, the complaint doesn't fairly put us on notice that that's plaintiffs' actual allegation of a chain of causation for a Section 9 claim, and the other was our legal argument that

creating future habitat is essentially a recovery function; it's not a Section 9 take claim.

And so I guess I'm left with the question of are we litigating the width of our buffers or are we not on this complaint. And in their response, I was -- it failed to clarify that issue for the State.

THE COURT: I don't see this case as one litigating the width of riparian buffers. Certainly -- well, I don't see it as litigating that, the width.

I do see live as a possibility in this case something that you may view as creating habitat but which I see differently, and that is whether logging near streams that by virtue of logging eliminates trees that would have fallen and become habitat can be a viable Section 9 claim.

Is that a principle you disagree with?

MS. WESTON: As a matter of law, Your Honor, it's our position that failing to protect trees that might grow and some day become habitat for a listed species, we think that's inconsistent with the way that the U.S. solicitor general has on behalf of the services interpreted Section 9, and particularly the habitat modification regulation, and also with the case law that says that we need to be talking about identified species that are here now for a Section 9 take claim to exist.

And I understand the Court's ruling, but that's

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our -- I want to make sure our argument is clear. And in the complaint, the mechanisms of take that they allege are logging on steep slopes and hauling those logs on roads that are hydrologically connected. They don't allege as a mechanism of take failure to ensure that large wood enters these streams. And if that's the argument, we would ask that that be clarified in the complaint and they say that out loud. And this obviously is a legal issue that we will preserve and continue to dispute where we can. THE COURT: Thank you. MS. WESTON: And one other question --THE COURT: Let me take that up first and come back to you. I'm going to talk to your opponent about that, and I'll come back to your other question. So that raises two questions. One is whether in fact you are not litigating the width of riparian buffers in this complaint. Is that correct? MS. ATWOOD: Yes, Your Honor. That would be a policy-level challenge. I have three points about the stream buffers and the related issue of large woody debris. One is that yes, you're

I have three points about the stream buffers and the related issue of large woody debris. One is that yes, you're right, Your Honor, they are habitat. In fact, that's exactly what the service said in the preamble to the final special rule. I would encourage the Court to take a look at that, because the special rule expressly contemplates logging and

removal of large woody debris and the loss of riparian canopy cover. So it is habitat. As soon as it is removed, that habitat has been impaired at the very least because it is canopy cover, but it also is habitat, according to the National Marine Fisheries Service, that will be very important for the recovery of the species.

And then --

THE COURT: So is that a method of take that you are alleging or going to allege in an amended complaint?

MS. ATWOOD: Yes, Your Honor. We will make that very clear in our amended complaint.

THE COURT: It's not clear in the current complaint. So I think in terms of being clear, you're going to want to allege that one of the ways take or harm, harassment or whatever occurs is -- if that's what you're going to do, this method of take.

MS. ATWOOD: I am going to do that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MS. ATWOOD: And just one other point, if I may.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. ATWOOD: We are alleging harm, and certainly that's a central component of our take theory. We also are alleging harassment, which has a different definition, and the courts have said where harm may not apply, even if you're going to entertain that idea, then there's still the possibility that

it's harassment.

THE COURT: All right. I understand that. I think what the State is asking at the pleading stage that I agree with is that there has to be a close and careful connection between the things that you describe as harmful to fish and the ways in which you allege the State is engaging in a violation of the statute.

Sometimes you've alleged negative impacts without connecting them up to theories of statutory violation. So those have to be carefully tied together.

Your next question?

MS. WESTON: Yes, Your Honor.

The final component of our motion to dismiss was that the Court dismiss the complaint to the extent it seeks to have the Court order defendants to obtain an HCP/ITP on an enforceable timeline.

THE COURT: I don't read the complaint that way. To the degree that ever becomes what plaintiffs' theory is, I agree with you that that is not something I have the power to order the State to do.

MS. WESTON: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. ATWOOD: May I just note one thing regarding that, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. ATWOOD: Many courts have ordered states to apply

for an ITP by a date certain, exercising their injunctive -I'm sorry, their equitable authority.

THE COURT: But that, of course, is at the relief

complaint, right?

MS. ATWOOD: That's right. I'm just pointing that

stage after victory, not something you're alleging in the

out.

THE COURT: I understand that you think that the equitable powers I have upon your ultimate victory may be larger than what would be allowed at the complaint stage. I'm going to stick to the complaint stage now, and I agree that you cannot seek via complaint for me to order the states to get an ITP.

MS. ATWOOD: And the complaint as currently drafted does not ask for that. I simply point out that some courts have ordered state agencies to apply -- not necessarily obtain but to apply for an ITP.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Anything further from any defendant?

MR. WALDRON: Your Honor, I just want to actually thank you on behalf of Tillamook County for letting us know your thinking as you go along. Because there's going to be a lot more motions, and this potentially has such a devastating effect on the school system or the county, that the commissioners need to plan as we go through this case for the

future.

THE COURT: You're welcome.

So the reason that we've had this discussion, which is different than most hearings where I just hear arguments and rulings, is that we're trying to set out the parameters by which an amended complaint doesn't result in just a second round of the same arguments. So I think it's useful to go ahead and sort of work that out in advance. Otherwise, you know, we just do the same thing all over again, to everyone's cost and detriment.

So I hope that we've given plaintiff some guidance by which it could weave a path to craft a complaint that while it will certainly face other challenges, will not face the same ones all over again.

We'll be in recess.

THE CLERK: Court is in recess.

(Proceedings concluded at 11:37 a.m.)

--000--I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause. A transcript without an original signature or conformed signature is not certified. /s/Bonita J. Shumway February 26, 2019 BONITA J. SHUMWAY, CSR, RMR, CRR DATE Official Court Reporter

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